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Abstract
Does policymakers' horizon a®ect their willingness to support economic reforms? Voting
in the U.S. Congress provides an ideal setting to address this question. Di®erences between
the House and Senate, in which members serve two-year and six-year mandates respectively,
allow to examine the role of term length; the staggered structure of the Senate allows
to compare the behavior of di®erent \generations" of senators and study the impact of
election proximity. Considering all major trade liberalization reforms undertaken by the
U.S. since the early 1970's, we ¯nd that Senate members are more likely to support them
than House members. However, inter-cameral di®erences disappear for third-generation
senators, who face re-election at the same time as House members. Considering Senate
votes alone, we ¯nd that the last generation is more protectionist than the previous two
and this result holds both when comparing di®erent senators voting on the same bill, as
well as individual senators voting on di®erent bills. Inter-generational di®erences disappear
instead for senators who hold safe seats or have announced their retirement, indicating that
the protectionist e®ect of election proximity is driven by legislators' fear of losing o±ce.
JEL classi¯cations: D72, F10
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Why do policymakers so often fail to undertake economic reforms, supporting instead costly and
ine±cient policies? In this paper, we provide a new answer to this important question, showing
that short-term re-election incentives can represent a key obstacle to the adoption of structural
reforms.1 In particular, we show that the fear of losing o±ce deters legislators who are close to
facing re-election from supporting trade liberalization reforms.
In our analysis, we exploit two institutional features of the U.S. Congress, namely the fact that
House and Senate members serve terms of di®erent length { two and six years, respectively { and
that U.S. senators' terms in o±ce are staggered { i.e., one third of the Senate is up for re-election
every two years. These two characteristics make the U.S. Congress an ideal setting to answer
important questions about the role of policymakers' horizon in shaping economic reforms:2 at
any point in time, it is possible to compare the voting behavior of legislators with mandates
of di®erent length, as well as the behavior of senators belonging to di®erent \generations", i.e.,
with di®erent remaining time in o±ce. Furthermore, exploiting the fact that many senators
cast ballots on various trade reforms, we can also study their voting behavior at di®erent times
during their terms in o±ce.3
To the best of our knowledge, this is the ¯rst paper to systematically investigate how the
political horizon of elected representatives a®ects their support for large-scale economic reforms.
We focus on trade liberalization measures, using a novel dataset constructed for this purpose.
We have collected data on all individual recorded (roll call) votes on major trade liberalization
bills that have been introduced in the U.S. Congress since the early 1970's. These include the
rati¯cation and implementation of multilateral trade agreements (Tokyo and Uruguay Round of
the GATT) and preferential trade agreements (e.g., CUSFTA and NAFTA) negotiated during
this period, as well as on the conferral and extension of fast track trade negotiating authority to
the President. We have complemented this information with a wealth of time-varying character-
istics of the legislators (e.g., party a±liation, age, gender, contributions received by labor and
corporate groups, seat \safety") and of their constituencies (e.g., dependence on export relative
to import-competing jobs, concentration of import and export industries, size), covering both
1Much attention has been devoted in the literature to the political economy of reforms. These are major
policy changes that go beyond regular government decisions, including structural reforms (e.g., trade or labor
market liberalization) and stabilization reforms (e.g., important ¯scal adjustments to drastically reduce budget
de¯cits and/or in°ation). See Drazen (2000) and Persson and Tabellini (2000) for broad reviews of the literature
and Alesina, Ardagna, and Trebbi (2006) for a recent contribution.
2In most other countries, even if legislators belonging to the lower and upper house are elected for terms of
di®erent lengths, members of the same house face elections at the same time (this is for instance the case in
Australia and in France). An important exception is Argentina, where both houses of the Congreso Nacional
have a staggered structure.
3For example, during her ¯rst mandate as senator from New York state, Hillary Clinton voted on six trade
liberalization bills, four times in favor (during the ¯rst four years) and twice against (during the last two years).
1economic and non-economic drivers of individual voting decisions on trade reforms.
We ¯rst examine the role of term length, comparing the voting behavior of House and Senate
members. We ¯nd that senators are in general more likely to support trade liberalization than
House representatives. However, there is no signi¯cant di®erence in the voting behavior of
House representatives and senators who are in the last two years of their mandate, two groups
of legislators who share the same \political horizon", facing re-election at the same time. This
evidence suggests that di®erences in term length are the reason behind the less protectionist
stance of U.S. senators.
We then move to the core of our analysis, where we focus on the role of election proximity,
comparing the voting behavior of di®erent generations of Senate members. We ¯nd robust
evidence that senators of the last generation are signi¯cantly less likely to support trade reforms
than senators belonging to the ¯rst two generations. Inter-generational di®erences are not only
statistically signi¯cant, but also sizable: when comparing di®erent legislators voting on the same
bill, we ¯nd that senators who are in the last two years of their terms are around 10 percentage
points less likely to support trade reforms than senators who have just been elected. We obtain
comparable results when we study the behavior of the same legislator over time. These ¯ndings
highlight the important role played by election proximity in inducing a protectionist behavior
among members of the U.S. upper house.
Our analysis also shows that the protectionist e®ect of election proximity is a pervasive phe-
nomenon, not driven solely by \anti-trade" legislators: inter-generational di®erences in senators'
voting behavior can be observed among representatives of both import-competing and export
constituencies, and among members of both the Democratic and Republican party.
Why do legislators become more protectionist when they approach the end of their mandate?
A natural explanation for this ¯nding is represented by re-election incentives. To assess their
role, we carry out two falsi¯cation exercises, focusing on senators which have been elected with
a very large margin and thus enjoy a \safe seat", and on senators who have announced that
they will not stand for re-election. We ¯nd that in neither case does proximity to election make
senators more protectionists. This evidence suggests that fear of losing o±ce is the key driver
behind the cycling behavior observed among U.S. senators at large.
Our analysis shows that short-term electoral incentives can signi¯cantly reduce legislators'
support for trade liberalization reforms. In line with what suggested by the Founding Fathers
of the U.S. Constitution, our results imply that legislators serving longer terms in o±ce may be
better placed to deal with structural reforms such as trade liberalization.4
4In the Federalist (63), Madison (1788) pointed out that
The objects of government may be divided into two general classes: the one depending on measures
which have singly an immediate and sensible operation; the other depending on a succession of
well-chosen and well-connected measures, which have a gradual and perhaps unobserved operation.
2The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brie°y reviews the related
literature. Section 3 describes the data used for our analysis and provides some descriptive
statistics. Section 4 reports the results of the comparison of the voting behavior of House and
Senate members, while Section 5 focuses on di®erent generations of senators. Section 6 concludes,
discussing the interpretation of our ¯ndings and suggesting avenues for future research.
2 Related literature
Our analysis is related to several strands of the literature. First, it contributes to the body of
works that has studied the political economy obstacles to the adoption of economic reforms (see
footnote 1). One of the seminal contributions in this area is the paper by Fernandez and Rodrik
(1991), which shows that uncertainty about who will enjoy the gains from trade liberalization can
lead a rational electorate to oppose the reform ex ante, even when welfare is known to increase
ex post for a majority. Several other papers have examined the political viability of economic
reforms in the presence of distributional e®ects and uncertainty. For example, Dewatripont and
Roland (1995) introduce aggregate uncertainty in the framework of Fernandez and Rodrik (1991)
to analyze the optimal sequencing of economic reforms. Alesina and Drazen (1991) show how
a stabilization reform can be delayed due to a \war of attrition" between two groups, each of
which is uncertain about the costs being incurred by the other group. None of these papers has
examined the role of legislators' political horizon, which is instead the focus of our analysis.
Our work is also related to the literature on political business cycles, which emphasizes the
importance of electoral calendars when politicians are o±ce motivated. In particular, Rogo® and
Sibert (1988) and Rogo® (1990) show that incumbent politicians who want to retain o±ce may
increase spending prior to elections to signal greater \competence" when voters are rational but
imperfectly informed. This literature is aimed at explaining cyclical °uctuations in short term
economic policies during mandates of ¯xed length. We instead examine how di®erences in term
length and electoral calendars a®ect policymakers' willingness to support structural reforms such
as the reduction or removal of trade barriers.
Our empirical strategy builds on a vast political science literature that analyzes the e®ects
of term length and election proximity on legislative behavior. Rather than studying the deter-
minants of legislators' behavior on speci¯c economic reforms such as trade liberalization, these
studies focus on their \ideological position", usually captured by congressmen's \voting scores"
To deal with long-term policies, Madison suggested the creation of an additional chamber, the Senate:
The proper remedy for this defect must be an additional body in the legislative department, which,
having su±cient permanency to provide for such objects as require a continued attention, and a
train of measures, may be justly and e®ectually answerable for the attainment of those objects.
3{ summary indexes of their voting record on a broad set of issues (e.g., ADA scores, D-Nominate
and W-Nominate scores). Some papers in this tradition analyze how election proximity a®ects
senators' ideological positions (e.g., Thomas 1985, Bernhard and Sala 2006). Other papers ex-
amine instead the e®ects of election proximity on senators' responsiveness to the desires of the
polity (e.g., Amacher and Boyes 1978, Glazer and Robbins 1985, Levitt 1996). These studies
compare senators' voting scores to measures of their constituencies' preferences and ¯nd that,
while there are considerable discrepancies between the two, the gap gets smaller closer to elec-
tions. Two recent contributions, Titiunik (2008) and Dal Bo and Rossi (2011) use instead an
experimental setting to study the e®ect of di®erent term lengths on legislator's performance.5
Our paper also contributes to the literature on political economy of trade policy, which shows
how di®erent political factors (e.g., lobbying by interest groups, governments' ability to commit
to policy choices, di®erent electoral systems) shape trade policy outcomes (see, for example,
Grossman and Helpman 1994, Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare 1998, and Grossman and Helpman
2005). This is the ¯rst paper to focus on the role of term length and election proximity.
Finally, our analysis is related to the empirical literature looking at the determinants of the
voting behavior of U.S. congressmen on speci¯c economic policies. In his seminal contribution,
Peltzman (1985) linked senators' voting patterns with changes in the economic interests of their
constituencies. A more recent paper in this tradition is Mian, Su¯, and Trebbi (2010), which
examines how constituencies' interests, lobbying, and politicians' ideology shape congressional
voting behavior on two important recent bills: the American Housing Rescue and Foreclosure
Prevention Act of 2008 and the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008.6 Our paper is
closely related to those studies focusing on the determinants of trade policy votes (e.g., Bloni-
gen and Figlio 1998, Baldwin and Magee 2000, Karol 2007). None of these contributions has
examined the role of policymakers' horizon. Interestingly, our analysis provides an explanation
for a puzzle identi¯ed by Karol (2007): senators are systematically less protectionist than House
representatives, but this cannot be explained by constituency size. We show that inter-cameral
di®erences in voting behavior can be explained by the longer length of senators' terms in o±ce.
3 Data
To carry out our analysis, we have assembled a novel dataset that allows us to link our dependent
variable, a congressman' recorded vote on a trade liberalization bill, to a wealth of characteristics
5Titiunik (2008) examines the e®ect of a randomly assigned term length on the behavior of a small group of
state senators in Arkansas and Texas. Dal Bo and Rossi (2011) consider two natural experiments in the Argentine
legislature (in 1983 and 2001), when politicians were assigned di®erent term lengths through a randomized
procedure. Both papers reach the conclusion that longer terms in o±ce lead to better performance (for instance
in terms of °oor attendance, or number of bills sponsored by a legislator).
6Another recent contribution is Facchini and Steinhardt (2011), who have analyzed the drivers of voting
behavior on U.S. immigration policy.
4of the legislators and their constituencies, enabling us to investigate the role played by both
economic and non-economic drivers of individual voting decisions. In this section, we describe our
data, starting from our dependent variable. We describe next the individual-level characteristics,
and ¯nally turn to the procedure we have followed to construct our district-level controls.
3.1 Votes on trade reforms
Our dependent variable is the recorded (roll call) vote of U.S. congressmen on all major trade
liberalization bills introduced in the U.S. Congress between 1973 and 2005.7 Table 1 lists the
votes used in our empirical analysis. These include the roll call votes on the implementation of
multilateral trade agreements (Tokyo and Uruguay Round rounds of the GATT) and preferential
trade agreements negotiated in this period,8 as well as the votes on the conferral and extension
of fast track trade negotiating authority to the President.9
We distinguish between the 50 U.S. states { electing each two representatives for the Senate {
and the 435 congressional districts { each electing one member of the House of Representatives.
As it can be seen from Table 1, for each decision in the House and Senate less than 435 and
100 votes are reported, respectively. This is because some congressmen may not be present
or may decide to abstain. Moreover, a seat in Congress may be vacant at any point in time
because of special circumstances (e.g., resignation, death). Overall, we consider 29 votes, 15 in
the House and 14 in the Senate (see Table 1).10 For each of them, we collected the identity of
the congressmen, their state or district, and their decision (in favor or against) from roll call
records.
Looking at Table 1, notice that in all but one case the trade reform has been approved, even
though the passage margin varies substantially across bills. However, this is not a concern for
our analysis, since we focus on the determinants of individual legislators' voting behavior, rather
than on the actual approval of the reform.
3.2 Characteristics of legislators
Table 2 provides de¯nitions and sources for all the variables included as controls in our anal-
ysis (top panel), or used in the construction of such controls (bottom panel). We start with
congressmen's characteristics.
7Our sample starts in 1973 because of the challenge involved in the construction of some of the key regressors.
See section 3.3 for details.
8We had to exclude the bills on the rati¯cation of the US-Bahrain and US-Israel free trade agreements, which
were approved by voice votes in at least one of the houses.
9See Conconi, Facchini, and Zanardi (2011) for a theoretical and empirical analysis of the role of fast track
authority in international trade negotiations.
10The Senate did not vote on the fast track bill of 1998, since the House had already rejected it.
5The main regressors of interests for our analysis are the indicator variable Senatej, which is
equal to one for legislators belonging to the upper house, and the indicator variables for the three
generations of senators. As already discussed, one third of the Senate is elected every two years,
together with the entire House. We de¯ne those senators facing election within two years (the
so-called \in cycle"), as belonging to the third generation; those who face elections next belong
to the second generation, while the ¯rst generation includes senators facing elections no sooner






t thus identify whether the
senator representing state j is in the ¯rst, middle, or last two years of his mandate, respectively,
when voting on a trade bill in year t.
Party a±liation is known to be a strong predictor of a politician's support for trade liberal-
ization, with Democrats being systematically more protectionist than Republicans (e.g., Hiscox
1999, Baldwin and Magee 2000, and Karol 2007). To assess the role played by a congressman's
ideological position, we employ the dummy variable Democrat
j
t, which is equal to one if the
representative of constituency j at time t belongs to the democratic party, and zero otherwise.11
Age and gender have been shown to be important drivers of individual-level preferences for
trade policy (see Mayda and Rodrik 2005). For this reason, we include these demographic
characteristics of a congressman also in our empirical analysis.
Senators are known to be running more often for President than House members (see also
Table 3). To verify whether presidential ambitions in°uence congressmen's voting behavior and
can explain inter-cameral di®erences in voting behavior on trade policy, we have constructed the
dummy variable Presidential aspirations
j
t, which captures whether a legislator has taken part in
presidential primaries in the years following each vote in the sample. In some speci¯cations, we
also control for whether or not congressmen are in their ¯rst term in o±ce (including the dummy
variable Incumbent
j
t) and for their tenure (captured by the variable Years in Congress
j
t).
A ¯nal set of variables have only been collected for senators, since they are used to ver-
ify the robustness of the cycling behavior of senators across generations. A long tradition has
emphasized the role that interest groups play in shaping international trade policy (e.g., Gross-
man and Helpman 1994, Goldberg and Maggi 1999, and Gawande and Bandyopadhyay 2000)
and the voting behavior of U.S. congressmen on trade liberalization bills (e.g., Baldwin and
Magee 2000). To assess the role of lobbying pressure, we have thus constructed measures of
Labor contributions
j
t and Corporate contributions
j
t received by each senator throughout the po-
litical cycle. These variables are based on individual-level transactions reported to the Federal
Electoral Commission (FEC) since 1979.12
11As discussed at the end of the section, we have also tried using alternative measures of ideology (the DW-
Nominate scores and the ACU conservative rating index), obtaining very similar results.
12In particular, we have collected information on each transaction between a political action committee (PAC)
and an elected congressperson from the FEC website, and aggregated it by political cycle. In this way, we
have been able to gather information on the amounts of PAC contributions received by an individual senator





t, collecting information on which legislators belong to the two most
powerful Senate committees (see Stewart and Groseclose 1999).
Finally, we have constructed two controls to capture the extent to which legislators are
exposed to competition for their seats, in order to assess the role played by re-election incentives
in explaining inter-generational di®erences in senators' voting behavior (see Section 5.4). First,
we have used information on the margin of victory recorded by a senator in the last election (i.e.,
the gap between the share of votes obtained by the winner and the one of the next competitor) to
construct the dummy variable Safe
j
t, which equals one for legislators who have been last elected
with a large margin of victory.13 Second, we have constructed a Retiring
j
t dummy variable for
senators who decide to leave o±ce, which is equal to 1 in the Congress immediately prior to
their retirement.14
3.3 Characteristics of constituencies
In order to capture the trade policy interests of each constituency, we control for the time-varying
share of import-competing workers in a given state or congressional district. To do so, we ¯rst
de¯ne an industry (i.e., at 2-digit SIC level or 3-digit NAICS level; see footnote 15 for details)
as being import-competing (export), if the U.S. as a whole is a net importer (exporter) in that
industry in a given year. We then collect information on employment in import-competing and
export industries for all constituencies. Such variables can be easily constructed for the Senate,
since state-level series are readily available. For the House of Representatives, on the other hand,
we encountered two main di±culties. First, congressional district-speci¯c data are not readily
available, and must be constructed by aggregating county-level data using the County Business
Patterns (CBP), a survey collected by the Bureau of the Census.15 Importantly, a county may
be split into di®erent districts, some of which cover parts of neighboring counties. The second
di±culty is that the geographic de¯nition of districts changes over time, following each decennial
Census, when districts are re-apportioned following changes in population.
We have addressed these concerns as follows. To obtain district-level data from county level
throughout his six years in o±ce, rather than just during the last two years of his mandate (the latter information
is more readily available).
13We considered seats to be secured if the margin of victory exceeded 60 percent. This threshold corresponds
to the average margin of victory in the Senate plus two standard deviations.
14Following Overby and Bell (2004), we classify as retiring those senators who voluntarily departed (for personal
reasons or to pursue other o±ce), but exclude those who were expelled or defeated in either primary or general
elections.
15The CBP report annual data on employment by SIC manufacturing industries up to 1997 and by NAICS
manufacturing industries from 1998 onwards, with very little detailed information for agriculture. However,
manufacturing industries represent the lion's share of total imports and exports of the United States (i.e., at
least 70 percent in each year from 1970 until today). Moreover, many agriculture-related activities are classi¯ed
as manufacturing and are thus included in our dataset (e.g., dairy products, grain mill products, sugar).
7information, we ¯rst extract yearly county-level data from the CBP and then aggregate them
at the district level. For those counties split across more than one district, we follow Baldwin
and Magee (2000), among others, imputing employees proportionally to the share of population
of a county assigned to that district. To deal with the problem of redistricting, we have kept
track of changes in the boundaries of the electoral districts that occurred after the Censuses of
1970, 1980, 1990 and 2000. For example, Alaska has always had only one congressional district;
between the ¯rst vote in 1973 and the last one in 2005, California saw instead the size of its House
delegation increase from 43 to 53 representatives, whereas instead New York state's number of
districts declined from 39 to 29 over the same time period.
Notice that employment data in the CBP are withheld when their disclosure would allow
researchers to identify ¯rms. In such cases, a °ag gives the interval where the actual data belongs
to (e.g., between 0 and 19 employees, between 20 and 99 employees and so on). These °ags have
been used to input values (i.e., the mid point of each interval) for the missing observations. In
order to minimize the problem of undisclosed data, we use CBP employment data at the 2-digit
SIC and 3-digit NAICS levels rather than at more disaggregated levels.
Using employment data by congressional district and by state, we compute the number of em-
ployees in export and import-competing industries for all constituencies. For each constituency
j in year t, we then de¯ne the variable Export ratio
j
t, which captures dependence on export











t ) is the number
of employees of constituency j in export (import) industries at time t. In some speci¯cations,
we also use the dummy variable Export
j




Legislators' voting behavior on trade policy may also be a®ected by the degree of indus-
try concentration in export and import-competing industries. We thus construct time-varying
Her¯ndahl-Hirschman Indexes for export industries and import-competing industries located in
constituency j, denoted with HHI exports
j
t and HHI imports
j
t, respectively.
It could be argued that possible di®erences in voting behavior between Senate and House
members may be driven by di®erences in the size of their constituencies. In particular, since
senators have larger electoral bases, they may be less responsive to narrowly de¯ned industry
interests. We thus control for the size of each constituency, as proxied by Population
j
t.
Table 3 reports summary statistics for the main variables of interest for the pooled sample
of observations for the House and the Senate (used in the ¯rst part of our empirical analysis),
and for the Senate alone (employed in the second part of the analysis). These statistics indicate
that constituencies are on average import-competing, since the mean of the variable Export ratio
is below 1. As for the industry concentration indexes, employment in the export industries is
more concentrated than in the import industries as fewer sectors are export oriented. Some of
the other summary statistics con¯rm well-known stylized facts about the U.S. Congress. For
8example, female legislators are a clear minority, senators tend to be older than House members
and to run more often for President. The descriptive statistics already show a clear inter-cameral
di®erence in trade policy voting: trade liberalization bills passed in the Senate by a (statistically
signi¯cant) larger margin than in the House.
4 Inter-cameral di®erences in voting behavior
In this section, we start by examining the voting behavior of all congressmen, to verify whether
House members are indeed more protectionist than Senate members, as previously argued by
Karol (2007). We then contrast House members and di®erent generations of Senate members
to establish whether inter-cameral di®erences in voting behavior are driven by senators' longer
terms in o±ce.
4.1 House vs Senate
We start by comparing the voting behavior of Senate and House members. The dependent
variable in our analysis, V ote
j
t, is dichotomous and equals one if the congressman representing
constituency j in year t has voted in favor of trade liberalization, and zero otherwise. Our
baseline speci¯cation is thus given by
Prob(V ote
j








where ©(¢) is the cumulative normal distribution (i.e., probit model) and House members are
the omitted category. The main variable of interest is the Senate dummy. X is a matrix of
district-speci¯c characteristics, which are de¯ned for each constituency j;16 Z is a matrix of
additional controls, which may or may not be time-invariant and district speci¯c; ¯0, ¯1, ¯2, and
¯3 are the vectors of parameters to be estimated. We cluster standard errors by state-decade,
thus allowing for the geographical correlation within each state to change over time (i.e., our
sample spans three decades). Moreover, in order to facilitate the interpretation of the estimated
coe±cients, in the tables we report marginal e®ects (calculated at the mean of each regressor).
The estimates of various speci¯cations are presented in Table 4. In the ¯rst three columns,
we report the results of a series of parsimonious speci¯cations, where the only explanatory
variables are the Senate dummy and a set of year or state ¯xed e®ects, or both. We ¯nd that
senators are more likely to support trade liberalization bills.17 Year ¯xed e®ects are jointly
16For simplicity, when discussing the results of our regressions, we drop all j and t indices.
17In the simplest possible speci¯cation with only the Senate dummy, its coe±cient is also positive and signi¯cant
at the 1 percent level. The estimates of the various ¯xed e®ects are not reported to save on space. All the results
and tests not reported in the text are available upon requests.
9signi¯cant and suggest that over time the likelihood of voting in favor of trade reforms has
declined, indicating an erosion of the support for trade liberalization. Similarly, state ¯xed
e®ects are jointly signi¯cant.18
The remainder of the table contains a series of robustness checks to investigate the role played
by additional drivers of trade liberalization votes which have been identi¯ed by the existing
literature. Importantly, in all the speci¯cations, the estimate for the Senate dummy continues
to be positively and signi¯cantly correlated with voting decisions on trade reforms. As for its
economic signi¯cance, the estimated marginal e®ects imply that Senate members are between 8.8
and 15.7 percentage points more likely to vote in favor of trade liberalization (over the average
predicted probability).
In column (4) we add controls for congressmen's party a±liation and demographic charac-
teristics, as well as for the size and the trade interests of a constituency. We ¯nd that Senate
membership increases the probability of supporting trade liberalization by 11.6 percentage points.
In line with previous studies, support for trade reforms is signi¯cantly lower (by 43.5 percent) for
members of the Democratic party and for older legislators. The impact of Export ratio is positive
and signi¯cant, suggesting that the larger is the share of export workers in a constituency, the
more likely its representative is to favor trade liberalization. In line with the results of Karol
(2007), senators' trade votes are unrelated to constituency size, as proxied by Population.
The results reported in column (5) show that inter-cameral di®erences are also robust to the
inclusion of concentration measures for export and import-competing industries. Notice that
this leads to a more precisely estimated and more signi¯cant coe±cient for the variable Export
ratio.
In column (6), we control for the role of presidential aspirations and ¯nd that congressmen
who participated in a presidential primary in the years following the trade vote tend to be more
protectionist, although the coe±cient is not signi¯cant.19
4.2 House vs di®erent generations of senators
Next, we exploit the staggered nature of senators' electoral calendars. This speci¯c institutional
feature of the U.S. Congress implies that, at any point in time (i.e., for every vote in our
sample), one third of the senators have the same electoral horizon as House members (i.e., they
face elections in less than two years). This gives rise to a \quasi experimental" setting: since
electoral calendars are exogenously assigned to each Senate seat, we can compare the voting of
18Notice that these ¯xed e®ects can be included in our probit regressions because our unit of analysis is a vote,
with variation both within and over years and states.
19There is indeed substantial anecdotal evidence that presidential candidates tend to campaign on a protec-
tionist platform, even if { once elected { they end up taking a more moderate stance. For instance, in the last
presidential campaign, Barack Obama took a more protectionist stance (e.g., suggesting that he would review
the NAFTA agreement) than what implied by his policy decisions as President (see discussion in Section 6).
10legislators with di®erent remaining time in o±ce.
We estimate the following probit model:
Prob(V ote
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in which House members are the omitted category. The main regressors of interest are the
dummy variables for the three generations of senators. In particular, the coe±cient of the
variable Senate3 captures the stance of those senators which are up for re-election ¯rst, together
with all House members.
In Table 5 we report the estimates of the same type of speci¯cations as in Table 4, with a
focus on the indicator variables referring to the di®erent generations of senators. Notice that, in
all speci¯cations in which we control for time e®ects, the coe±cient for senators belonging to the
third generation is never signi¯cant, while the dummies for the other two generations are always
positive and signi¯cant at the 1% level.20 Depending on the speci¯cation, senators from the ¯rst
generation are between 13.2 and 15.3 percent more likely to support trade liberalization measures
(over the average predicted probability) than members of the House. The tests at the bottom
of the table con¯rm that the estimate for the dummy of the third generation is statistically
di®erent from those of the other two generations, and there is no statistical di®erence between
senators belonging to the ¯rst and second generation.
These ¯ndings suggest that congressmen's political horizon plays an important role in their
decision to vote in favor or against trade liberalization bills. Indeed, senators in the last two
years of their mandate do not behave di®erently from House members, who face elections at
the same time as them; senators in the ¯rst two generations are instead more pro trade than
House members, and this result is even stronger than what suggested by the marginal e®ect of
the Senate dummy in Table 4, where all senators are treated identically.
As for the e®ect of the additional controls, their impact is very similar to the results re-
ported in Table 4. In particular, Democrats and older congressmen are systematically more
protectionist, while representatives of constituencies with a higher Export ratio are more likely
to support trade reforms. The other variables are not signi¯cant determinants of congressmen's
voting decisions.
4.3 Additional robustness checks
To further assess the robustness of our results on inter-cameral comparisons, we have performed
a series of additional estimations, the results of which are available upon request.
20The coe±cient °3 is insigni¯cant even in the simplest possible speci¯cation, where only the generations
dummies are included.
11First, we have introduced further controls for legislators' constituencies (i.e., real GDP per
capita, unemployment rate, and percentage of population above 65 years).21 Including these
variables does not alter our main results, even though we ¯nd a negative and signi¯cant e®ect
of unemployment on the support for trade liberalization.
Second, we have carried out the analysis on di®erent subsets of trade votes. In particular,
we have focused on: i) votes on the rati¯cation of all regional and multilateral trade agreements
negotiated by the United States since the early 1970s; ii) votes on the rati¯cation of the most
important of these agreements (Tokyo and Uruguay Rounds, CUSFTA and NAFTA), iii) votes
on the conferral or extension of fast track authority to the President; iv) votes on bills introducing
policy changes rather than maintaining the status quo (i.e., we have excluded from the analysis
bills on the extension of fast track authority). In all cases, our results continue to hold.
The trade variable used in our benchmark analysis is based on whether the United States
is a net importer/exporter in a given industry relative to the rest of the world (see Table 2 for
details). It may be argued that this is an imprecise measure when it comes to the rati¯cation of
speci¯c preferential trade agreements (PTAs), because of the idiosyncrasies of U.S. trade patterns
with its trading partners.22 For these votes, we have thus constructed a di®erent version of the
Export ratio variable based on the net trade position of the United States vis-µ a-vis PTA partners.
The qualitative results of our analysis are also una®ected when using alternative measures of
constituencies' trade interests.
Finally, we have included additional political controls for the legislators. In particular, we
have accounted for whether they are serving their ¯rst mandate, and for the number of years
they have been in Congress. These variables are never found to have a signi¯cant e®ect on
legislators' voting behavior on trade reforms and our results concerning the comparison between
House members and di®erent generations of senators continue to hold. The same is true if we
replace party a±liation with alternative measures of congressmen's ideological orientation, i.e.,
the Conservative rating index provided by the American Conservative Union (ACU) and the
DW-Nominate scores (see Poole and Rosenthal 2001).
5 Di®erent generations of senators
We now move to the core of our analysis, in which we examine the role of election proximity on
legislators' voting behavior. To do so, we focus on votes cast in the U.S. Senate alone, exploiting
its staggered structure and the fact that many of its members have voted on various trade bills
21These variables are not included in the benchmark analysis of Tables 4 and 5, since they are only available
at the state level.
22For example, in recent years, the U.S. is an overall net importer of \Textile Product Mills", but it is a net
exporter of these goods to Australia, Chile, Singapore, with which it has signed a PTA.
12during their careers.
We follow two complementary strategies. First, we compare how senators belonging to di®er-
ent generations vote on the same bill, thus exploiting di®erences across legislators. We estimate
the following probit model, in which the ¯rst generation is taken as the omitted category:
Prob(V ote
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Second, since our sample spans three decades, we can observe the votes that the same senator
has cast on various trade bills, when belonging to di®erent generations (i.e., at di®erent times
during his mandate). We can thus exploit the variation over time in the voting behavior of
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In this case, only senators that voted on more than one bill (and not always in favor or against
protection) are retained in the analysis.
5.1 Comparison across senators
The results reported in Table 6 are based on the comparison of the voting behavior of di®erent
senators voting on the same bill. Notice that the marginal e®ect for the variable Senate3 is
always negative and statistically signi¯cant at the 1 percent level. Thus, compared to the
omitted category (senators in the ¯rst two years of their mandates), \in-cycle" senators are less
likely to support trade liberalization reforms. In particular, our estimates suggest that they are
around 10 percent less likely to vote for trade liberalization.24 This can also be seen in Figure 1
below, in which we plot predicted probability for senators belonging to di®erent generations.25
These ¯ndings imply that election proximity can be an important obstacle for the adoption
of trade reforms. Consider, for example, the last vote cast in the U.S. Congress on a major trade
reform, i.e., the rati¯cation of the DR-CAFTA free trade agreement between the United States,
the Dominican Republic, and several Central American countries (see Table 1). This bill passed
23The qualitative conclusions are una®ected if we estimate instead a probit model with individual legislator
¯xed e®ects. Notice that, since our unit of analysis is the vote, we can estimate a probit model with congressmen's
¯xed e®ects. However, because of the large number of ¯xed e®ects, we prefer to report the results of a conditional
logit model. We have also run a linear probability model, obtaining very similar results.
24Notice that this e®ect is smaller than what discussed in Section 4, because the comparison is now with respect
to senators the furthest away from elections, and not with respect to House members.
25The dotted line in Figure 1 depicts the average predicted probability that senators vote in favor of trade
reforms (based on column 4 of Table 6); the symbols in dark grey are the predicted probabilities of di®erent
generations of senators, while the symbols in lighter grey represent their 95% con¯dence interval.
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in the Senate by a margin of only ¯ve votes. Our results on inter-generational voting di®erences
suggest that, had all senators been up for re-election at the time of the vote, this agreement
would not have been rati¯ed. 26
The estimates for the other regressors are in line with the results obtained in the previous
section. However, the Democrat dummy has a much smaller marginal e®ect (reducing the
probability of a vote in favor by less than 20 percentage points), indicating that the di®erence
between Democrats and Republicans in their propensity to vote for trade liberalization bills is
bigger in the House than in the Senate. On the contrary, age seems to have a bigger impacts
on senators than on House representatives. Overall, the qualitative conclusions that we reached
when comparing senators are the same as those identi¯ed in Section 4: there is clear evidence
of a protectionist e®ect as senators approach the end of their electoral mandate.
5.2 Comparison within senators
We now turn to the analysis of the impact of election proximity on the voting behavior of
individual senators on di®erent bills during their political career.
Table 7 reports the results of estimations that focus on senators' votes and include ¯xed
26Based on the estimates of our benchmark speci¯cation (column 4 of Table 6), the predicted probability of a
vote in favor of the DR-CAFTA trade agreement is 52.17% when senators belong to di®erent generations, but
drops to 46.19% in the counter-factual scenario in which all senators belong to the last generation.
14e®ects for individual legislators. As mentioned above, in these \within" estimations, only the
observations for senators who voted more than once and changed the behavior across trade
liberalization bills are retained. As a result, our sample size is now reduced to 754 observations.
Notice also that we consider the same speci¯cations as in Table 5, but exclude the Female and
Democrat controls, as well as the state ¯xed e®ects, since they show little or no variation at the
individual level. We also exclude Age, as it is collinear with year ¯xed e®ects in these within
estimations.
As it can be seen from all speci¯cations included in the table, an individual senator in the
last two years of his mandate is systematically less likely to support trade liberalization than the
same senator in the ¯rst four years of his mandate. Indeed, looking at the individual behavior
of U.S. senators over their career in Congress, we can see that various senators never voted in
favor of a trade liberalization bill in the last two years before re-election, but did vote in favor
at least once earlier in their terms.27 The results for the other regressors are in line with our
previous ¯ndings.
In column (6) we control for the contributions received by a given senator during each congress
cycle, i.e., when belonging to di®erent \generations". The inclusion of these extra regressors does
not a®ect our previous results, and in particular the coe±cient for Senate3 is always negative
and statistically signi¯cant at the 1 percent level. Thus, the more protectionist stance of sen-
ators toward the end of their mandate does not seem to be driven by the timing of political
contributions. As for the the impact of lobbying more generally, we ¯nd that neither labor nor
corporate PAC contributions play a statistically signi¯cant role, even if the direction of their
e®ects is in line with what found by Baldwin and Magee (2000) in their study of voting by
members of Congress on three trade bills introduced in the early 1990's.28
5.3 The pervasive e®ect of election proximity
The results presented in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 above show that senators are signi¯cantly less likely
to support trade liberalization reforms when they are close to facing elections. Is this ¯nding
driven solely by the voting behavior of \anti-trade" legislators, i.e., representatives of import-
competing constituencies and members of the Democratic party? To address this question, we
have examined whether senators' cycling behavior depends on the trade policy interests of their
constituencies and their party a±liation.
The results of these estimations, which are reported in Table 8, show that the protectionist
27Examples of this type of voting behavior include Senators Brown (CO), Clinton (NY), Dixon (IL), Feinstein
(CA), Stabenow (MI), Reed (RI), and Wo®ord (PA).
28We also tried interacting labor and corporate contributions with the indicator variables for senate generations,
to determine whether lobbying pressure has a di®erent impact on legislators at di®erent times during their
mandate. The coe±cient for the interaction terms were not signi¯cant.
15e®ect of election proximity is pervasive: the same cycling behavior is observed among representa-
tives of both import-competing constituencies (the coe±cient of the variable Senate3 in columns
1-3 is negative and signi¯cant) and export constituencies (the test at the bottom of columns
1-3 is signi¯cant); and among both Republican senators (the coe±cient of the variable Senate3
in columns 4-6 is negative and signi¯cant) and Democratic senators (the test at the bottom
of columns 4-6 is signi¯cant). Thus election proximity deters legislators from supporting trade
liberalization reforms, even if they represent constituencies in which most workers are employed
in export industries or they belong to the \pro-trade" Republican party.
Table 8 also shows that, earlier in their mandate, representatives of export constituencies are
more willing to support trade liberalization reforms than representatives of import-competing
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t is positive but not signi¯cant). These ¯ndings suggest that, when
elections approach, all legislators pander to the protectionist sentiments of import-competing
workers. Even if these are a minority of the electorate in some constituencies, they may be the
only voters who actually decide whether to re-elect their representatives based on their trade
policy choices (see discussion in Section 6).
5.4 The role of re-election incentives
Thus far our analysis has shown that election proximity leads legislators to become more protec-
tionist. What drives this result? A natural explanation is represented by electoral incentives. To
assess their role, in this section we carry out two falsi¯cation exercises, arguing that legislators
who are not afraid of losing o±ce should not be responsive to electoral calendars. In particular,
we focus on two kinds of senators: those who have been elected with very large margins of
victory, who know that there is very little chance that they will lose their seat, and those who
have announced their retirement, and thus do not care about their re-election chances.29
If re-election motives are the reason behind the inter-generational di®erences in voting behav-
ior documented above, we would expect the protectionist e®ect of election proximity to disappear
for senators with very safe seats and for those retiring. To verify this hypothesis, we run a series
of regressions in which we compare senators of the last generation with those of previous gener-
ations, and distinguish senators whose seat is Safe or who are Retiring. Considering that some
senators have safe seats for long spells of their political career and that we have few observations
with retiring senators, we will only show the results of estimations based on the comparison of
the voting behavior across di®erent senators. Moreover, since our previous results suggest that
29This is similar to the strategy used by Mian, Su¯, and Trebbi (2010), who make use of information on retiring
legislators and \competitive" seats (the opposite of \safe" seats) to verify the role of re-election incentives.
16there is no statistical di®erence in behavior between senators in the ¯rst and second generation,
we consider these together as the omitted category.
Our ¯ndings are presented in Table 9. Notice that in all speci¯cations the coe±cient for the
variable Senate3 is negative and highly signi¯cant, con¯rming that senators in the last two years
before re-election are less likely to support trade reforms than senators who are in the ¯rst four
years of their terms in o±ce. Thus election proximity has a protectionist e®ect on trade policy
voting behavior.
Column (1) reports the result of a speci¯cation in which we introduce as controls the inter-
action terms between the two classes of senators (Senate3 and Senate12, for senators belonging
to the last and the ¯rst two generations, respectively) and the variable Safe, which is equal to
one for senators last elected with a margin of victory of at least 60 percentage points. Such
a threshold corresponds to the average margin of victory plus two standard deviations, and is
meant to capture very safe seats. The positive and signi¯cant coe±cients on the interaction
terms indicate that being secured in one's seat has a positive e®ect on the likelihood that a
senator will support trade reforms. More importantly, the test at the bottom of the table shows
that there are no signi¯cant inter-generational di®erences among senators with secured seats:
senators who are not concerned about losing their seats are no more protectionist during the
last two years of their terms in o±ce than during the ¯rst four.
This result suggests that the protectionist e®ect of election proximity found for legislators
who were not elected with very large margins of victory is driven by their fear of losing o±ce.
These ¯ndings are con¯rmed in columns (2) and (3), which report the results of alternative
speci¯cations including additional controls for the legislators and their constituencies, in line
with what done in previous tables.
In the last three columns of Table 9, we apply a similar logic to senators who have announced
their retirement. Columns (4)-(6) report the results of speci¯cations in which we introduced the
dummy variable Retiring as a control. Since we do not have information on the exact date when
the retiring decision was taken, we cannot look at whether retiring senators change their behavior
during their mandate. We can, however, compare the behavior of those who have announced
that they will leave o±ce with that of senators who are running for re-election. Notice that the
coe±cient for Retiring is positive (and signi¯cant in two out of three speci¯cations), con¯rming
that re-election incentives deter politicians from supporting trade reforms. In addition, the test
at the bottom of the table indicates that retiring in-cycle senators are no more protectionist
than senators in the ¯rst two generations.30
30Interestingly, two of the trade liberalization votes in our sample (the ¯rst approval of fast track in December
1974 and rati¯cation of the Uruguay Round Agreement in December 1994) occurred following the November
general elections, but before the newly elected congressmen have taken their seats. In line with the above results
on retiring senators, we ¯nd that none of the defeated senators approaching the end of their tenure (\lame ducks")
voted against these trade liberalization bills.
17The results of Table 9 strongly suggest that re-election incentives are the key reason behind
the protectionist e®ect of election proximity: senators are signi¯cantly less likely to support
trade reforms during the last two years of their terms in o±ce, with the probability of voting
in favor of trade liberalization bills being between 8 and 9 percentage points lower for senators
who are in the last two years of their mandate; however, this cycling behavior \disappears" for
senators who are not afraid of losing o±ce, either because they have been elected with very wide
margins of victory, or because they have decided not to run for re-election.
5.5 Additional robustness checks
We have performed a series of additional estimations to further check the robustness of our
¯ndings concerning inter-generational di®erences in senators' voting behavior.
Our analysis above already accounts for various individual-level characteristics of the leg-
islators (e.g., party a±liation, age, gender, seat safety). The literature on U.S. congressional
politics suggests that other variables may also play an important role in shaping their voting
behavior. In a series of additional estimations we have thus includes additional political controls
for senators. In particular, we account for whether or not they are in their ¯rst term in o±ce
(Incumbent), for how many years they have served (Years in Congress), and whether they are
members of the two most powerful Senate committees (Appropriations committee and Finance
committee). Table 10 reports the results of these estimations. In columns (1)-(3), we examine
the e®ect of election proximity by comparing the voting behavior of di®erent senators voting
on the same bill. Columns (4)-(6) focus instead on the behavior of individual legislators voting
on di®erent bills. In all speci¯cations, our main result continue to hold, i.e., senators belonging
to the last generation are signi¯cantly more protectionist than senators belonging to the ¯rst
and second generation. Incumbency and tenure do not appear to play a signi¯cant role, while
membership in the Appropriation and Finance committees tends to increase support for trade
liberalization reforms.
Introducing additional controls for legislators' constituencies, carrying out the analysis using
di®erent subsets of trade votes, or using alternative measures of trade policy interests does not
a®ect our results (see Section 4.3 for more details). The results of these estimations are available
upon requests.
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we have examined how term length and election proximity a®ect policymakers'
willingness to support trade reforms. Our analysis of the determinants of all votes on major
U.S. trade liberalization bills cast since the early 1970's shows that House representatives are
18generally more protectionist than members of the Senate. However, this di®erence disappears for
senators in the last two years of their mandate, who share the same \political horizon" as House
members. These results suggest that inter-cameral di®erences in voting behavior are driven by
di®erences in term length.
When considering Senate votes alone, we ¯nd that the last generation is more protectionist
than the previous two: senators who are in the last two years of their terms are signi¯cantly
less likely to support trade reforms than senators who are further away from re-election. This
result holds both when comparing the behavior of di®erent senators voting on the same bill,
and the behavior of individual senators over time; it also survives the inclusion of a large set of
individual-level and district-level controls, and the use of di®erent econometric methodologies.
Inter-generational di®erences in support for trade reforms disappear only for senators who hold
\safe seats" or are retiring, indicating that the protectionist e®ect of election proximity is driven
by the fear of losing o±ce.
Our ¯ndings suggest that short-term re-election incentives can be an important obstacle to
the adoption of structural reforms such as the removal of trade barriers. Electoral calendars
can thus crucially a®ect trade policy outcomes, since legislators are often supportive of trade
liberalization at the beginning of their mandates, but turn against it as they approach their
re-election date.31 Short-term re-election motives can also explain why most politicians tend to
campaign on protectionist platforms. For instance, Barack Obama was accused of pandering to
import-competing workers during his presidential campaign, when he attacked NAFTA as being
\devastating on the community" and stated \I don't think NAFTA has been good for America,
and I never have".32
An important avenue of future research is to develop new theoretical models to shed light on
the mechanisms through which policymakers' horizon can a®ect trade policy choices. Existing
models cannot readily account for the observed e®ects of term length and election proximity on
congressmen's voting behavior, since they do not examine how electoral calendars a®ect trade
policy choices. We can think of two broad mechanisms that could provide a explanation for our
¯ndings.
The ¯rst is lobbying. Inter-generational di®erences in senators' voting behavior may arise in
a setting in which legislators care about aggregate welfare, but are also in°uenced by interest
groups through campaign contributions (e.g., Grossman and Helpman 1994) and protectionist
lobbies exercise more pressure on policymakers who are close to elections. Our empirical analysis
31For example, our estimates suggest that the DR-CAFTA free trade agreement between the U.S., the Domini-
can Republic, and several Central American countries would not have been rati¯ed had all senators been in the
last two years of their mandates (see footnote 26).
32He later admitted in an interview with Nina Easton (\Obama: NAFTA Not So Bad After All," Fortune,
6/18/08) that his campaign rhetoric had been \overheated and ampli¯ed", stressing that \politicians are always
guilty of that, and I don't exempt myself".
19does not seem to support this mechanism, since inter-generational voting di®erences persist even
after we account for the amount of corporate and labor contributions received by individual
senators throughout their mandate.33 However, a systematic analysis of the role of lobbying in
explaining the e®ects of electoral calendars on trade policy choices would require more detailed
data on campaign contributions, allowing to identify the source and purpose of the payments
received by individual senators over time.
An alternative explanation for our ¯ndings is that legislators pander to the protectionist
preferences of the electorate, to maximize their chances of remaining in o±ce. Indeed, opinion
surveys show that most U.S. voters are opposed to trade liberalization.34 Legislators may be
particularly responsive to protectionist sentiments at the end of their mandates, if they believe
that voters su®er from a \recency bias", i.e., attach greater weight to the recent performance of
incumbent politicians when assessing their accomplishments.35 Legislators can thus \get away
with" voting in favor of trade liberalization at the beginning of their terms; when they are close
to facing re-election, they instead oppose trade reforms for fear of losing o±ce.
Notice that this pandering e®ect may occur even if only a minority of the electorate opposes
trade liberalization, because voters are heterogeneous in the intensity of their preferences over
di®erent policy issues. Although most voters decide whether to re-elect incumbent politicians
based on their choices on \frontline" policy issues (e.g., government spending on health and
education, or the degree of income redistribution), trade reforms (which are often considered
\secondary" policy issues) may be salient to some groups of voters who feel hurt or threatened
by them. Legislators will thus oppose trade reforms to please these voters.36 In line with this
idea, our empirical analysis shows that the protectionist e®ect of election proximity is a pervasive
phenomenon: even senators representing export constituencies, in which only a minority of
33It is worth noticing that existing political economy models do not examine the role of the timing of lobbying
pressure. A priory, it is not obvious whether contributions should be concentrated at the beginning or at the end
of legislators' mandates. On the one hand, legislators may be more receptive to lobbying pressure when they are
closer to re-election and are more in need of contributions to ¯nance their campaigns. On the other hand, having
cash available at the beginning of a campaign may help deterring potential challengers. Moreover, lobbies may
prefer to o®er contributions earlier, when politicians can still deliver on their policy promises.
34A recent literature has examined the determinants of individuals' trade policy preferences, focusing on the
role of labor market attributes. These studies show that a majority of individuals oppose trade liberalization.
For example, based on the 1992 round of the U.S. National Election Studies (NES) survey, Scheve and Slaughter
(2001) ¯nd that 67% of the respondents are in favor of more restrictive trade policies, and similar patterns have
been highlighted also by Blonigen (2011) when looking at more rounds of the NES survey, and by Mayda and
Rodrik (2005) using a broad cross section of countries.
35The idea of a \recency bias" in voting goes back to the in°uential contribution by Weingast, Shepsle, and
Johnsen (1981) and is supported by a large empirical literature (see Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000 for a review).
Numerous studies have also shown that the incumbent party's fortunes in U.S. presidential elections are crucially
a®ected by recent economic conditions (e.g., Eisenberg and Ketcham 2004).
36List and Sturm (2006) argue that \secondary" issues, such as trade or environmental policies, have little
impact on the majority of the electorate, but substantially a®ect a minority of voters. The preferences of these
voters may be strong enough to induce them to be \single-issue voters," who base their re-election decisions on
this particular issue. Politicians may thus distort their policy choices in such secondary areas to attract these
voters.
20workers are employed in import-competing industries, become less supportive of trade reforms
toward the end of their mandate.
Another avenue for future research is to examine whether election proximity a®ects legislators'
voting behavior on other types of economic reforms. The institutional features of the U.S.
Congress could be used to examine how electoral calendars shape legislators' voting behavior on
other economic reforms on both \frontline" and \secondary" policy issues.37
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kTable 3: Descriptive statistics
House and Senate Senate
Variable Observations Mean Std. dev. Observations Mean Std. dev.
Vote
j
t 7,664 0.687 0.464 1,254 0.750 0.433
Senatej 7,664 0.174 0.379
Senate1
j
t 7,664 0.058 0.234 1,254 0.325 0.449
Senate2
j
t 7,664 0.059 0.235 1,254 0.337 0.473
Senate3
j
t 7,664 0.057 0.231 1,254 0.338 0.473
Democrat
j
t 7,664 0.535 0.499 1,254 0.540 0.497
Female
j
t 7,664 0.098 0.297 1,254 0.085 0.279
Age
j
t 7,664 54.48 10.159 1,254 58.89 9.958
Population
j
t 7,664 1.429 3.030 1,254 5.066 5.656
Export ratio
j
t 7,664 0.442 0.540 1,254 0.528 0.550
HHI exports
j
t 7,664 0.506 0.279 1,254 0.503 0.292
HHI imports
j
t 7,664 0.156 0.086 1,254 0.136 0.062
Presidential aspirations
j
t 7,664 0.026 0.158 1,254 0.105 0.307
Labor contributions
j
t 754 56.286 96.96
Corporate contributions
j
t 754 176.491 258.662
Safe
j
t 1,213 0.047 0.215
Retiring
j
t 1,254 0.043 0.203
Export
j
t 1,254 0.138 0.345
Finance committee
j
t 1,254 0.201 0.401
Appropriation committee
j
t 1,254 0.278 0.448
26Table 4: Trade Liberalization votes: House vs Senate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Senatej 0.064*** 0.110*** 0.083*** 0.087*** 0.087*** 0.095***
(0.023) (0.022) (0.024) (0.031) (0.032) (0.034)
Democrat
j






























Year e®ects included included included included included
State e®ects included included included included included
Observations 7,664 7,664 7,664 7,664 7,664 7,664
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.06 0.16 0.26 0.26 0.26
Log likelihood -4,296.29 -4,465.14 -3,988.51 -3,516.28 -3,513.69 -3,512.23
Â2 363.36*** 1,035.55*** 2,320.58*** 2,528.36*** 2,583.56*** 2,770.67***
Predicted probability 0.72 0.70 0.73 0.75 0.75 0.75
The table reports marginal e®ects of probit regresssions. The dependent variable, Vote
j
t, equals 1 if the
congressman votes in favor of trade liberalization, 0 otherwise. Standard errors clustered at state-decade
level in parenthesis; *** denotes signi¯cance at 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level.
27Table 5: Trade Liberalization votes: House vs generations of senators
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Senate3
j
t 0.015 0.063** 0.032 0.040 0.040 0.049
(0.030) (0.026) (0.030) (0.038) (0.038) (0.040)
Senate2
j
t 0.079*** 0.133*** 0.104*** 0.106*** 0.106*** 0.113***
(0.027) (0.024) (0.026) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031)
Senate1
j
t 0.095*** 0.124*** 0.107*** 0.105*** 0.104*** 0.111***
(0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.033) (0.033) (0.035)
Democrat
j






























Year e®ects included included included included included










t 9.96*** 5.88** 8.93*** 6.13** 6.12** 5.87**
Observations 7,664 7,664 7,664 7,664 7,664 7,664
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.06 0.16 0.26 0.26 0.26
Log likelihood -4,292.12 -4,461.44 -3,984.28 -3,512.71 -3,510.09 -3,508.69
Â2 364.89*** 1,128.72*** 2,435.48*** 2,561.10*** 2,537.26*** 2,738.03***
Predicted probability 0.72 0.70 0.73 0.75 0.75 0.75
The table reports marginal e®ects of probit regresssions. The dependent variable, Vote
j
t, equals 1 if the
congressman votes in favor of trade liberalization, 0 otherwise. Standard errors clustered at state-decade level
in parenthesis; *** denotes signi¯cance at 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level.
28Table 6: Senator generations, di®erent legislators voting on the same bill
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Senate3
j
t -0.077*** -0.075*** -0.090*** -0.081*** -0.081*** -0.080***
(0.026) (0.027) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.026)
Senate2
j
t -0.015 0.000 -0.017 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009
(0.029) (0.032) (0.032) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029)
Democrat
j






























Year e®ects included included included included included





t 5.16** 6.47*** 6.13** 5.90** 6.01** 5.95**
Observations 1,331 1,254 1,254 1,254 1,254 1,254
Pseudo R2 0.09 0.17 0.28 0.31 0.31 0.31
Log likelihood -661.04 -583.65 -508.83 -485.79 -484.68 -485.25
Â2 88.18*** 340.03*** 1,122.25*** 2,084.78*** 1,541.58*** 1,659.92***
Predicted probability 0.79 0.79 0.82 0.84 0.84 0.84
The table reports marginal e®ects of probit regresssions. The dependent variable, Vote
j
t, equals 1 if the
congressman votes in favor of trade liberalization, 0 otherwise. Standard errors clustered at state-decade
level in parenthesis; *** denotes signi¯cance at 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level.
29Table 7: Senator generations, same legislator voting on di®erent bills
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Senate3
j
t -0.855*** -0.888*** -0.874*** -0.888*** -0.873***
(0.224) (0.224) (0.230) (0.226) (0.273)
Senate2
j
t -0.344 -0.340 -0.304 -0.340 -0.372*
(0.212) (0.216) (0.221) (0.216) (0.219)
Population
j
t 0.265 0.284 0.265 0.266
(0.213) (0.212) (0.213) (0.178)
Export ratio
j
t 0.693* 1.396*** 0.693* 0.711*





















Year e®ects included included included included included





t 6.02** 7.06*** 7.45*** 6.89*** 4.01**
Observations 754 754 754 754 754
Pseudo R2 0.21 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.22
Log likelihood -251.91 -249.47 -246.19 -249.47 -248.72
Â2 72.65*** 80.24*** 101.44*** 81.32*** 94.29***
The table reports coe±cient estimates of conditional logit models for all regressors.
The dependent variable, Vote
j
t, equals 1 if the congressman votes in favor of trade lib-
eralization, 0 otherwise. Standard errors clustered at congressman level in parenthesis;






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































32Table 10: Additional political controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Senate3
j
t -0.084*** -0.079*** -0.094*** -0.881*** -0.844*** -0.888***
(0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.224) (0.229) (0.224)
Senate2
j
t -0.011 -0.006 -0.334 -0.009 -0.290 -0.287
(0.029) (0.029) (0.030) (0.216) (0.220) (0.220)
Democrat
j












t 0.006 0.003 0.006 0.269 0.221 0.305
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.213) (0.221) (0.208)
Export ratio
j
t 0.101** 0.101** 0.084* 0.719* 0.724* 0.629*

















Year e®ects included included included included included included
State e®ects included included included
Senator e®ects included included included
Observations 1,254 1,254 1,254 754 754 754
Pseudo R2 0.32 0.31 0.33 0.22 0.22 0.23
Log likelihood -482.85 -484.60 -472.11 -249.23 -248.85 -245.32
Â2 1,499.43*** 1,439.42*** 1,389.90*** 79.18*** 82.14*** 96.56***
Predicted probability 0.84 0.75 0.75
The dependent variable, Vote
j
t, equal to 1 if congressman votes in favor of trade liberalization, 0 otherwise.
Columns (1)-(3): marginal e®ects of probit regressions, standard errors clustered at state-decade level in
parenthesis; Columns (4)-(6): coe±cients of conditional logit regressions, standard errors clustered at the
congressman level in parenthesis; *** denotes signi¯cance at 1% level; ** 5% level; * 10% level.
33